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INTRODUCTION

U.S. immigration agencies first began using DNA tests to verify family
relationships in 2000.1 Little changed about that use of DNA tests in the immigration
context until the summer of 2018, when Health and Human Services (“HHS”) Secretary
Alex Azar announced a plan to use DNA testing to reunite thousands of children and
parents who had been separated at the United States-Mexico border in the preceding
months and had not yet been reunited.2 Since then, the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”) and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have rapidly expanded DNA
collection and analysis in the immigration sphere.3 Most notably, in October 2019, the
DOJ proposed regulations that would require DNA collection from immigration
detainees and storage of their genetic information in the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s (“FBI”) Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”), a national DNA
database for criminal forensic investigation.4 In March 2020, these regulations, largely
unchanged, were finalized.5
Each of these recent expansions of the use of DNA testing in the immigration
context has prompted intense outcry from advocates for immigrants. What is it about
this technology—which has revolutionized health care, criminal investigations, and
genealogy—that makes it objectionable to use in this context? This Article recounts the
history of DNA testing in the U.S. immigration context; describes the privacy risks of
expanding DNA surveillance generally and for immigrants, in particular; and
summarizes the significance of DOJ’s new DNA collection policy for bioethics and
immigration law.
II.

DNA TESTING IN THE IMMIGRATION CONTEXT

Understanding U.S. policy on DNA testing in immigration contexts in the
past—and how past usage relates to current and proposed uses—is critical for
determining appropriate privacy safeguards as DNA testing and its many uses by the
government evolve.
A.

VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION IN DNA TESTING

1.

Immigration Petitions

Official guidance on the use of DNA testing for the purpose of verifying family
relationships by U.S. immigration agencies was first issued in 2000.6 Since that time,
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), a sub-agency of DHS that
processes immigration and naturalization applications, has accepted DNA test results as
1Memorandum from Michael D. Cronin, Acting Exec. Assoc. Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., Guidance on Parentage Testing for Family-Based Immigrant Visa Petitions (July 14, 2000) (on file with
the American Immigration Lawyers Association) [hereinafter Cronin Memo].
2Julia Ainsley, U.S. Has Nearly 3,000 Separated Migrant Kids, Will Use DNA to Find Parents, NBC
NEWS (July 5, 2018, 4:32 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/u-s-has-nearly-3-000separated-migrant-kids-will-n888986 [https://perma.cc/EW2Q-L63D].
3See discussion infra Sections II.A.3, II.B.2.
4DNA-Sample Collection from Immigration Detainees, 84 Fed. Reg. 56,397 (proposed Oct. 22, 2019)
(to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28).
5DNA-Sample Collection from Immigration Detainees, 85 Fed. Reg. 13,483 (Mar. 9, 2020) (to be
codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28).
6Cronin Memo, supra note 1.
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evidence of family relationships in the context of the family-based immigration petition,
which is the primary way in which noncitizens legally immigrate to the United States.7
Generally, immigration law permits U.S. citizens to petition for the admission of their
spouses, children, parents, and siblings, and permits lawful permanent residents to
petition for their spouses and children.8 DNA testing in the context of family-based
immigration petitions is not specifically authorized by statute or regulation, but is
described in policy documents for USCIS and the Department of State (“DOS”), which
evaluate immigration petitions involving intended beneficiaries located within and
outside of the United States, respectively.9
The policy and procedure for DNA testing in the context of family-based
immigration petitions for intended beneficiaries located within the United States has
changed very little since it was established in 2000.10 When documentary evidence of a
family relationship is unavailable or inadequate, immigration officers have discretion to
suggest the DNA test option to petitioners and intended beneficiaries.11 DNA testing is
voluntary.12 Participants are responsible for making necessary arrangements with an
accredited laboratory and for the costs.13 The results are sent directly to USCIS.14
Participants may request a copy of the results from the lab.15 Testing laboratories provide
results in the form of a degree of certainty of the plausibility of the claimed
relationship.16 If a DNA test indicates that the plausibility of the claimed relationship is
less than 99.5%, it is generally not accepted as proof of relationship.17 Immigration
officers consider the DNA test results alongside any other evidence submitted; therefore,
a DNA test establishing the claimed relationship does not guarantee approval of the
petition.18
2.

Reunification of Separated Families in the Summer of 2018

In October 2017, DHS began implementing a policy of routinely separating
immigrant families who attempted to enter the United States from Mexico outside of an
official port of entry in order to prosecute the parents for the misdemeanor crime of
illegal entry.19 In April 2018, the policy became official: DHS’s “zero-tolerance” policy

7See WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43145, U.S. FAMILY-BASED IMMIGRATION
POLICY 1 (2018) (noting that family-based immigration makes up two-thirds of all legal permanent
immigration); Cronin Memo, supra note 1.
88 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2), 1153(a) (2018).
9U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL AND HANDBOOK 601.11, DNA TESTING TO
VERIFY RELATIONSHIPS (2019); Policy Memorandum, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., DNA Evidence
of
Sibling
Relationships
3
(Apr.
17,
2018),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-04-17-PM-DNA-Evidenceof-Sibling-Relationships.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EAE-6P2D]; Cronin Memo, supra note 1 (describing policy
on DNA testing to establish parent-child relationships for family-based immigrant visa petitions involving
intended beneficiaries located within the United States).
10See Cronin Memo, supra note 1.
11Id.
12Id.
13Id.
14Id.
15Id.
16Id.
17Id.
18Id.
19Jonathan Todres & Daniela Villamizar Fink, The Trauma of Trump’s Family Separation and Child
Detention Actions: A Children’s Rights Perspective, 95 WASH. L. REV. 377, 380 n.6 (2020).
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directed prosecutors to charge every adult in such circumstances with criminal
immigration violations, even if the family expressed a credible fear of returning to their
country of origin.20 As children cannot be held in criminal detention, zero tolerance
required separating these adults from the children with whom they traveled to the
border—a secondary goal of the policy that the administration believed would deter
immigrant families from Central America from coming to seek asylum in the United
States altogether.21 Detained immigrant children are housed in facilities operated by the
Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”), a sub-agency of HHS.22
Criminal proceedings for most of the separated parents concluded in guilty
pleas with a sentence of time served.23 They were then detained in facilities operated by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), a separate sub-agency within DHS
responsible for adult immigration detainees.24 The vast majority were not reunited with
their children upon their return to ICE custody.25 Some parents were ultimately released
from ICE custody while their immigration cases were pending, and others were deported
to their countries of origin without their children.26 The media reported stories of
prolonged detention in poor conditions, traumatized children, and parents unable to
locate or obtain release of their children after release or deportation.27
On June 26, 2018, a federal district court directed DHS and HHS to reunify
immigrant parents and children who had been forcibly separated upon arriving at the
United States-Mexico border.28 The litigation revealed significant dysfunction in the
administration’s planning and execution of its family separation policy, including a
failure to properly record the identities and locations of immigrant children in its
custody.29 This mismanagement prevented DHS and HHS from relying on traditional
channels of verifying family relationships in order to comply with the court’s order.30
Amid this chaos, on July 5, 2018, ORR announced that it would use DNA tests
to verify the relationships between detained immigrant children and the adults seeking

20See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Announces Zero-Tolerance Policy for
Criminal Illegal Entry (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zerotolerance-policy-criminal-illegal-entry [https://perma.cc/M2MK-JZ6Y]. Prior to zero tolerance, adults who
expressed a credible fear of return were referred to the asylum system and the criminal charge of illegal entry
was dropped. WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45266, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S
“ZERO TOLERANCE” IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICY 1-2, 6 (2019) [hereinafter CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R45266].
21See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45266, supra note 20, at 2. DHS did not publicly acknowledge its policy
to separate immigrant children from their parents as a deterrence strategy until May 2018. Caitlin Dickerson,
The Youngest Child Separated from His Family at the Border Was 4 Months Old, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/16/us/baby-constantine-romania-migrants.html [https://perma.cc/6H85WZBD].
22CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45266, supra note 20, at 2.
23See Debbie Nathan, Hidden Horrors of “Zero Tolerance”— Mass Trials and Children Taken from
Their Parents, INTERCEPT (May 29, 2018, 10:26 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/05/29/zero-toleranceborder-policy-immigration-mass-trials-children/ [https://perma.cc/763N-Q4NB].
24See id.
25See Catherine E. Shoichet, The Next Family Separation Crisis: Finding Hundreds of Deported Parents,
CNN
(July
27,
2018,
9:35AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/27/politics/deported-parentssearch/index.html [https://perma.cc/B56L-HK38].
26See id.
27See, e.g., Todres & Villamizar Fink, supra note 19, at 383; Dickerson, supra note 21; Shoichet, supra
note 25.
28Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1142-44 (S.D. Cal. 2018).
29See id.; Todres & Villamizar Fink, supra note 19, at 385.
30See Ainsley, supra note 2.
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to have the children released into their custody.31 Part of ORR’s rationale for using DNA
tests was the looming court deadline to reunify children with their parents.32 Obtaining
birth certificates would take too long and ORR deemed information obtained from
children about their parents’ identity to be “unreliable.”33 This use of DNA tests was
different from prior usage in the immigration context in several ways. First, the U.S.
government was directly responsible for forcibly separating families. In family-based
immigration petition scenarios, petitioners and intended beneficiaries make the decision
to leave family members behind, even if it is under difficult circumstances.34 Second,
DNA tests were used as the first, and sometimes the sole, basis for determining family
relationships; until then, DNA tests had been used to confirm family relationships after
documentary evidence had been sought or considered.35 Third, DNA tests had never
before been deployed on such a mass scale for the purpose of verifying immigrant family
relationships.36
In the rollout of this unprecedented use of DNA testing in the immigration
context, DHS and HHS provided very little information to the public about why they
had decided to rely on DNA testing; the type of DNA test that would be performed and
the profile generated; how DNA samples and profiles would be stored, used, and
destroyed; how long profiles would be retained; and the impact of a non-match on
separated family members.37 Unsurprisingly, ORR’s announcement was widely
condemned by ethicists, scientists, and advocates for immigrants.38 The sources of
condemnation were various, and some critics absolutely opposed the use of DNA tests
for this purpose even though such tests could hasten reunification and have been used
for decades in other immigration contexts.39
31Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., HHS Is Executing On Its Mission With Care
And Compassion (July 6, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2018/07/06/hhs-executing-its-missioncare-and-compassion.html [https://perma.cc/GL5M-DMU6]; Maya Rhodan, Some 3,000 Migrant Kids Are
Still Separated from Their Parents. The Trump Administration Is Using DNA Tests to Match Them, TIME
(July 5, 2018), https://time.com/5331094/dna-tests-separated-families/ [https://perma.cc/D7DP-QVZ5]
(describing Azar’s announcement to the press on the day before).
32Rhodan, supra note 31.
33Ainsley, supra note 2.
34See Joanna Dreby, U.S. Immigration Policy and Family Separation: The Consequences for Children’s
Well-Being, 132 SOC. SCI . & MED. 245, 250 (2014) (describing how forced parent-child separations due to
immigration enforcement cause great anxiety and destabilization for families); id. (noting that parental choices
to migrate to the United States without their children affect those children differentially and, typically, less
acutely).
35Erin N. Oliphant & Sharon F. Terry, Reuniting Families Using Genetic Testing?, 22 GENETIC TESTING
& MOLECULAR BIOMARKERS 453, 453 (2018).
36See Daniella Silva, DNA Tests for Separated Families Slammed by Immigration Advocates, NBC NEWS
(July 5, 2018, 10:04 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/dna-tests-separated-families-slammedimmigration-advocates-n889161 [https://perma.cc/RC3K-43EA].
37See Oliphant & Terry, supra note 35, at 454 (describing lack of transparency in the collection and
storage of genetic information by HHS); Silva, supra note 36 (illuminating question as to necessity of genetic
testing for reunification).
38See, e.g., Catherine Lee & Torsten H. Voigt, DNA Testing for Family Reunification and the Limits of
Biological Truth, 45 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 430, 447 (2020) (introducing the concept of social validity
to argue that “DNA testing does not come closer to defining what a true family is.”); Nita Farahany et al.,
Ethical Guidelines for DNA Testing in Migrant Family Reunification, 19 AM. J. BIOETHICS 4, 4 (2019)
(discussing the international debate among bioethicists, geneticists, and practitioners over the new HHS
policy); Rhodan, supra note 31 (discussing advocates’ fury); Opinion, DNA Testing is Not the Way to Reunite
Families, BALT. SUN (July 2, 2018), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/readers-respond/bs-ed-rrimmigrant-dna-letter-20180702-story.html [https://perma.cc/6CSB-V746] (opposing HHS policy as
geneticists, genetic counselors, and ethicists).
39See Farahany et al., supra note 38 at 4-5 (pointing out that DNA testing has long been used in family
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On July 10, 2018, Judge Sabraw ordered DHS and ORR to use DNA tests “only
when necessary to verify a legitimate, good-faith concern about parentage or to meet a
reunification deadline.”40 The order required the government to attempt other
established techniques for determining family relationships before using DNA tests,
obtain consent from participating adults prior to conducting DNA tests, ensure that the
DNA samples and profiles generated from the tests would not be shared with federal
agencies outside of HHS, destroy DNA samples and profiles within one week of
obtaining a result, forbid contractors performing the DNA tests from retaining samples
and profiles, and require contractors to destroy samples and profiles within one week of
obtaining a result.41
It is unclear, even today, if all of the children who were separated from their
parents at the border under the “zero tolerance” policy have been reunited with their
parents, due to the inadequacy of DHS and HHS tracking systems.42 Although it is
unlikely that this or a future administration would implement a family separation policy
like the one that drew such popular condemnation in the summer of 2018, immigrant
children continue to be detained and separated from their family members at the
border.43 When the government determines that children would be unsafe in the custody
of a parent because of the parent’s criminal history, for example, it may decide to take
the children into ORR custody.44 Or if a child presents at the border with a relative who
is not their parent, the child may be separated from them and held in ORR custody until
the agency conducts background checks on family members seeking their release.45
Therefore, it is still important for ICE to have a thoughtful and comprehensive policy on
DNA testing to reunify immigrant family members.

immigration contexts and that DNA testing may reunify families); see also Rhodan, supra note 31 (quoting
one advocate calling DNA testing in this context the “grossest violation of human rights”).
40Order Following Status Conference at 3, Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, No. 18cv428
DMS (MDD) (S.D. Cal. July 10, 2018).
41Id. at 3 (citing Parties Proposal on Office of Refugee Resettlement Release Process at 7-8, Ms. L. v.
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, No. 18cv428 DMS (MDD) (S.D. Cal. July 9, 2018)).
42See More Than 5,400 Children Split at Border, According to New Count, NBC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2019),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/more-5-400-children-split-border-according-new-count-n1071791
[https://perma.cc/939F-DRE8]. Thousands of other children have been separated from their families either
before or after zero tolerance, and many remain in custody. Id.
43See Julia Ainsley, Family Separation is Back for Migrants at the U.S./Mexican Border, Say Advocates,
NBC NEWS (May 15, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/family-separation-backmigrants-u-s-mexican-border-say-advocates-n1208186 [https://perma.cc/VPM2-UBNX] (describing a
recently implemented process in which ICE permits parents who are detained with their children to apply for
their minor children to be released to family members, sponsors, or ORR while the parents remain in ICE
detention); Jeremy Stahl, Why Did the Government Separate This Family? SLATE (May 7, 2020),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/05/family-separation-salvador-rosita.html [https://perma.cc/K88RAX69] (stating that more than 1,150 children have been separated from the parents at the border between June
2018 and March 2020).
44See Stahl, supra note 43 (noting that family separations are legally permitted in cases of alleged
communicable disease and parental fitness as well).
45See Riane Roldan & Alana Rocha, Family Separations Aren’t Over. As Many as Five Kids Per Day
Are Separated from Their Parents at the Border., TEX. TRIB. (July 12, 2019, 12:00AM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2019/07/12/migrant-children-are-still-being-separated-parents-data-show/
[https://perma.cc/Z3U8-8UPZ] (explaining that children are sometimes released from custody into care of a
family member); see also Lomi Kriel, The Trump Administration Is Rushing Deportations of Migrant Children
during Coronavirus, ProPublica (May 18, 2020), https://www.propublica.org/article/the-trumpadministration-is-rushing-deportations-of-migrant-children-during-coronavirus
[https://perma.cc/NHY4WP3C] (explaining the process by which family members of detained children seek their release, which
includes a home study and fingerprint checks).
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Rapid DNA Testing Pilot Project at the Southern Border

After Judge Sabraw’s June 2018 order put an end to DHS’s family separation
policy, the administration became concerned that adult immigrants would seek more
lenient treatment by immigration officials by coming to the United States-Mexico border
with their or others’ children.46 At the time, family units with minor children at the
border who demonstrated a credible fear of persecution in their native countries were
processed differently from adults: They were less likely to be detained than adults
traveling without children because of legal limits on the length and conditions of
detention for children,47 and they were permitted to reside and work in the United States
while their asylum applications were pending.48
In response, DHS formulated a voluntary rapid DNA testing pilot project to
verify family relationships for the dual purposes of (1) determining how an otherwise
inadmissible claimed family unit should be processed and (2) aiding in the criminal
investigation and prosecution of immigrants making false claims about family
relationships.49 The pilot was conducted over a three-day period in May 2019.50 In midJune, ICE announced “a 120-day extension of the pilot program and expansion to five
additional locations along the southwest border to assess long-term implementation,
starting late June [2019].”51
Concurrent with the expansion of its rapid DNA testing pilot project in June
2019, DHS released a Privacy Impact Assessment (“PIA”) analyzing the privacy risks
and mitigation efforts related to its use of rapid DNA technology.52 The PIA describes
the process by which the expanded pilot is being implemented.53 If ICE personnel
suspect that members of a claimed family unit are lying about their relationship, they
can solicit the family members’ participation in rapid DNA testing.54 A short privacy
statement provided to immigrants selected for participation describes
[T]he purpose of the Rapid DNA testing, the legal authority under
which DNA is collected, that information related to the collection of
DNA (e.g., the existence of a positive or negative match) may be
46See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE RAPID DNA OPERATIONAL
USE
1
(2019),
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia-050-rapid-dna-operational-use
[https://perma.cc/DQ7T-2UYN] [hereinafter PIA FOR RAPID DNA].
47Id.; see Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. Jan.
17, 1997) (governing the treatment of children in federal custody).
48See Hearing on Oversight of Immigration Enforcement and Family Reunification Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 6 (2018) (statement of Matthew T. Albence, Exec. Associate Director, Enf’t &
Removal Operations, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Dep’t of Homeland Sec.),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/07-31-18%20Albence%20Testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z43E-83VG] (“[C]urrent laws and court rulings which favor the release of family units and
[unaccompanied alien children [UACs]] often require the federal government to release illegal alien families
and UACs into communities across the United States.”).
49See PIA FOR RAPID DNA, supra note 46, at 9, 16 (“The DNA is being collected to confirm or refute a
claimed biological parent-child relationship. ICE will use the results to identify family unit fraud at U.S. border
processing stations.”).
50News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, ICE Awards
New Contract for Rapid DNA Testing at Southwest Border, Expands Pilot Program (June 18, 2019),
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-awards-new-contract-rapid-dna-testing-southwest-border-expandspilot-program [https://perma.cc/3JFJ-MJAL].
51Id.
52PIA FOR RAPID DNA, supra note 46, at 1.
53Id. at 3-6.
54Id. at 4.
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shared according to federal law and policy, and that submitting to
Rapid DNA testing is voluntary, but that failure to submit to Rapid
DNA testing may be taken into account as one factor in ICE’s
assessment of the validity of the claimed parent-child relationship.55
Written consent for the test is obtained from adults on their own behalf and on behalf of
any claimed children.56 The PIA does not address the risk of coercion and how that might
impact an immigrant’s ability to meaningfully consent to participate in DNA testing.57
Finally, the PIA describes the technological and other limitations on ICE’s handling and
processing of DNA samples and test results.58
The rapid DNA testing pilot represents another shift in the use of DNA
analysis: from a tool for reunifying immigrant families to a tool for law enforcement
purposes. It is an example of “function creep,” defined as “the gradual and sometimes
imperceptible expansion of surveillance mechanisms, once in place, for secondary uses
beyond those originally intended or contemplated.”59 A system of surveillance instituted
for the purpose of identifying immigrant family units in order to determine their
treatment under immigration law is simultaneously used for the purpose of solving
unsolved crimes. It is also an example of the criminalization of immigration itself;
merely attempting to enter the country makes one an object of scrutiny for law
enforcement purposes. For those attempting to enter the country legally, failing to clear
any number of procedural hurdles can lead to criminal prosecution.60
B.

COMPULSORY DNA COLLECTION

1.

Refugee Family Reunification Pilot in East Africa

Historically, DHS and DOS have instituted compulsory DNA testing for only
one category of immigrants seeking family-based visas: participants in the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program Priority Three (“P-3”) program.61 These are the spouses, unmarried
children, and parents of people of designated nationalities who entered the United States
as refugees or who were granted asylum.62 Suspicions of fraud in the P-3 program were
the primary driver of the testing policy, which was piloted in 2008 and mandated in
2012.63 Although compulsory DNA tests have not been instituted in other family-based
immigration contexts, the possibility of expansion is real: The impetus for the pilot DNA
testing policy in the P-3 program was a 2006 recommendation by the USCIS
Ombudsman to DHS to issue regulations authorizing the USCIS Director to require
DNA tests as evidence of family relationships.64
55Id.
56Id.

at 8.

57Id.
58Id.

at 9.
Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1, 69-70 (2014).
60See id. at 25-26.
61See ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31269, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND
RESETTLEMENT POLICY 7 (2018).
62Id.
63Id.
64Memorandum from Prakash Khatri, Ombudsman, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., to Emilio
Gonzalez,
Dir.,
U.S.
Citizenship
&
Immigration
Servs.
1
(Apr.
12,
2006),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOmbudsman_RR_26_DNA-04-13-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/FM32WPRD] (suggesting “a recommendation to accept DNA test results as secondary evidence of family
59Anil
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Immigration Detainees

Congress authorized the Attorney General to collect DNA from persons in
federal custody, including immigration detainees, in the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005.65
The DNA profiles that are generated from this collection are stored in the FBI’s DNA
database, CODIS.66 The collection and storage of DNA information in CODIS is for the
purpose of law enforcement identification.67
The implementing regulations for the DNA Fingerprint Act mandate the
collection of DNA from all persons who are arrested on federal criminal charges and
from all “non-United States persons” in immigration detention.68 However, the Attorney
General has discretion to limit or exempt the collection of DNA by certain agencies.69
A special provision permitted the Secretary of Homeland Security to exempt DNA
collection from immigration detainees, including circumstances in which “collection of
DNA samples is not feasible because of operational exigencies or resource
limitations.”70 To date, DHS has not implemented compulsory DNA collection of
immigration detainees who do not have a criminal record, based on this exemption
authority.71
In October 2019, DOJ proposed regulations that would reallocate the
exemption authority for compulsory DNA collection from immigration detainees from
the Secretary of Homeland Security to the Attorney General;72 a final rule was issued on
March 9, 2020.73 Although DOJ accurately states that “this rulemaking does not require
DHS to expand DNA-sample collection,” former Attorney General Jeff Sessions made
no secret that this had been the intention since the rulemaking began.74 In anticipation
of the rule change, DHS began implementing a pilot project to collect DNA from
immigrants detained by Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) in the Detroit sector
and at the Eagle Pass Port of Entry in southwestern Texas.75 The final rule went into
effect on April 8, 2020.76
relationship, to grant authority to directors to require DNA testing and to initiate a DNA testing pilot project
to study the impact of requiring DNA testing as evidence of family relationship”).
65See 34 U.S.C. § 40702(a)(1)(A) (2018); see also DNA-Sample Collection Under the DNA Fingerprint
Act of 2005 and the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 73 Fed. Reg. 21,083, 21,083-84
(proposed Apr. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28).
6634 U.S.C. § 40702(b).
67Combined
DNA
Index
System
(CODIS),
FED.
BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis [https://perma.cc/FZF2-3B3J] (last visited
Apr. 14, 2020).
6828 C.F.R. § 28.12(b) (2019) (defining “non-United States persons” as “persons who are not United
States citizens and who are not lawfully admitted for permanent residence”).
69Id.
70Id.
71See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE CBP AND ICE DNA
COLLECTION 1 (2020) [hereinafter PIA FOR DNA COLLECTION] (citing Letter from Janet A. Napolitano,
Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. (Mar. 22, 2010)).
72DNA-Sample Collection from Immigration Detainees, 84 Fed. Reg. 56,397, 56,397 (proposed Oct. 22,
2019) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28).
73DNA-Sample Collection from Immigration Detainees, 85 Fed. Reg. 13,483, 13,483 (Mar. 9, 2020) (to
be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28).
74Id. at 13,488.
75News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (Jan. 6, 2020),
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-assess-collection-dna-samples
[https://perma.cc/M3CN-MUEZ].
76DNA-Sample Collection from Immigration Detainees, 85 Fed. Reg. 13,483, 13,483 (Mar. 9, 2020); see
Merrit Kennedy, Trump Administration Poised To Start Collecting DNA From Immigration Detainees, NAT’L
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PRIVACY RISKS OF EXPANDING DNA SURVEILLANCE

As a foundation for analyzing DOJ’s justification for expanding DNA
collection from immigration detainees, this Part provides an overview of privacy harms
related to mass collection and sharing of biometric information by the government, with
a focus on potential privacy harms arising from the new policy. Concerns about privacy
harms are among the most important reasons for the government to refrain from
expanding DNA databases and are often voiced when the government proposes to
expand biometrics surveillance on a mass scale.77 Increased collection and sharing of
DNA information across agencies enhances the government’s ability to surveil members
of the population.78 However, policymakers and courts have always balanced the value
of individual privacy with other values that are considered socially beneficial.79
For example, privacy harms associated with a certain level of government
surveillance in order to investigate crimes and protect public safety are generally
tolerated. U.S. law enforcement first began using DNA testing to investigate crimes by
linking crime scene evidence with the DNA of violent offenders.80 DNA profiles in
CODIS are stored permanently and can be accessed by law enforcement at any level
without consent, suspicion, or a warrant.81 Over time, state and federal laws rapidly
expanded the list of offenses eligible for DNA collection and profile retention in CODIS,
and some jurisdictions began collecting DNA from people who had merely been arrested
on suspicion of having committed a crime.82
The issue of whether the government may collect DNA from people who have
not been convicted of a crime implicates the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable search.83 Several federal and state courts that initially considered this
question reached opposite conclusions.84 In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
Maryland’s statute authorizing pre-conviction collection of arrestees’ DNA as a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, “[i]n light of the context of a valid
arrest supported by probable cause” relating to an alleged crime.85 The Court considered
compulsory DNA collection in this context to be reasonable because (1) it serves
important governmental interests related to law enforcement, (2) CODIS provides

PUB. RADIO (Mar. 6, 2020, 5:25 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/06/812940401/trump-administrationpoised-to-start-collecting-dna-from-immigration-detainees [https://perma.cc/QS7R-EX35].
77JENNIFER LYNCH, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., FROM FINGERPRINTS TO DNA: BIOMETRIC DATA
COLLECTION IN U.S. IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AND BEYOND 3, 7-8 (2012) (explaining the privacy issues
resulting from the expansion of DNA surveillance).
78Id. at 9.
79See id. at 12-13.
80Elec. Frontier Found., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for DNA-Sample Collection from Immigrant
Detainees (Nov. 12, 2019) [hereinafter EFF Comment].
81LYNCH, supra note 77, at 7-8.
82See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM OPERATIONAL AND LABORATORY
VULNERABILITIES, 3-6 (2006) (describing the gradual expansion of DNA collection for criminal justice
purposes through federal and state legislation).
83See LYNCH, supra note 77, at 12 (summarizing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on biometrics
collection).
84See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, The Supreme Court and Mandatory Collection of DNA from Arrestees –
“Stay” Tuned!, STAN. L. SCH. BLOGS: L. & BIOSCIENCES BLOG (July 22, 2012),
https://law.stanford.edu/2012/07/22/the-action-inaction-distinction-before-nfib-v-sebelius/
[https://perma.cc/5F5S-BT8Y] (summarizing court decisions considering the constitutionality of compulsory
DNA sampling from people arrested for crimes).
85Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465-66 (2013).
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adequate privacy protections, and (3) a cheek swab to collect DNA is a minimal intrusion
on individual privacy.86
In Immigration Surveillance, a seminal article documenting the rise of
surveillance mechanisms in immigration enforcement activities, Anil Kalhan adopts the
following definition of surveillance: “the systematic monitoring, gathering, and analysis
of information in order to make decisions, minimize risk, sort populations, and exercise
power.”87 He describes in detail the use of four surveillance activities in immigration
enforcement: “identification, screening and authorization, mobility tracking and control,
and information sharing.”88
In immigration enforcement, biometric identifiers such as fingerprints, facial
recognition-ready digital photographs, iris scans, palm prints, hand vein scans, voice
prints, and DNA are favored over documentation as more efficient and accurate
mechanisms to identify individuals.89 They are used to analyze, screen, and authorize
noncitizens in a variety of settings unrelated to international travel, including at “local
police stations, private workplaces, benefits agencies, universities, [and] health insurers
and providers.”90 Biometric information systems are one of several tools that the
government uses to track and control the movement of U.S. citizens and noncitizens
across borders.91 Finally, biometrics information of noncitizens is shared among several
government database systems, including systems housed in “intelligence agencies, law
enforcement, immigration authorities, international entities, foreign governments, and
other institutions, both public and private.”92
Biometric information about noncitizens—specifically fingerprints, facial
recognition-ready digital photographs, and iris scans—are stored in DHS’s Automated
Biometric Identification System (“IDENT”), which is housed in government-run data
centers.93 DHS is developing a new cloud-based system, the Homeland Advanced
Recognition Technology System (“HART”), which will contain all of the information
currently stored in IDENT and will have expanded capacity to store and analyze
additional biometric identifiers such as palm prints, scars, tattoos, physical markings,
and voices.94 Biometric information is linked to machine-readable travel documents
such as passports and visas, which incorporate biometric identifiers.95 ICE has recently
ramped up the routine collection of fingerprints from children in immigration detention,
including those held by CBP at or near the border with their parents and those in ORR
shelters.96
86Id.

at 463-64.
supra note 59, at 28 (quoting JOHN GILLIOM & TORIN MONAHAN, SUPERVISION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 2 (2013)).
88Id.
89Id. at 30.
90Id. at 32.
91See id. at 37 (describing complementary information systems used to track movement, including GPS
systems, cellular telephone location data, and automated license plate readers).
92Id. at 39.
93See id. at 30-31 (noting that IDENT stores information about some U.S. citizens as well, namely those
“enrolled in DHS’ registered traveler programs or who have adopted children from abroad,” or those who
were fingerprinted before naturalizing).
94See, e.g., Jack Corrigan, Legacy Systems Held DHS’ Biometrics Programs Back. Not Anymore.,
NEXTGOV (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.nextgov.com/it-modernization/2019/10/legacy-systems-held-dhsbiometrics-programs-back-not-anymore/160347/ [https://perma.cc/4KAX-JQNP].
95Kalhan, supra note 59, at 31-32.
96See, e.g., Hamed Aleaziz, ICE Is Now Fingerprinting Immigrants as Young as 14 Years Old,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 6, 2020, 7:42 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/ice87Kalhan,

264

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 46 NO. 2-3 2020

DOJ justifies its new policy requiring DNA collection from all immigration
detainees by describing several governmental interests that parallel the interests served
by collection from arrestees and that the Supreme Court relied upon in Maryland v.
King: “identification of persons in custody, facilitating safe and secure custody,
informing decisions concerning detention and release pending further proceedings,
clearing the innocent, and bringing the guilty to justice.”97 Ensuring public safety is the
overarching rationale.98
Finally, it is important to note that the title of this Article refers to DNA testing
at “the border.” By this term, I am referring not merely to a territorial boundary, but to
the more nuanced concept in which it is understood in the context of immigration
governance.99 Even after noncitizens have entered and are residing within the country,
they are subject to direct and indirect immigration enforcement, which “draws the
migration border inward, self-consciously constructing virtual, domestic border
checkpoints throughout the country’s interior.”100 Direct enforcement is the initiation of
removal proceedings based on unlawful presence or post-entry conduct such as criminal
convictions.101 Indirect enforcement can occur whenever a public or private actor must
verify immigration or citizenship status in order to make an eligibility determination.102
This includes many activities of day-to-day life, such as applying for a job, public
benefits, or a driver’s license; registering for school; seeking health care; renting a home;
or buying a bus ticket.103 Both types of enforcement have increased dramatically in
recent decades and can affect immigrants who have not recently crossed a territorial
border.104 Post-entry enforcement actions have fueled the growth of immigration
detention and will therefore fuel the growth of DNA surveillance of immigrants under
DOJ’s new policy.
A.

UNPREDICTED USES OF DNA DATA

immigration-customs-fingerprinting-refugees-teens [https://perma.cc/LV7V-4X3J]. CBP has discretion to
collect fingerprints from noncitizens under the age of 14 “in potentially criminal situations.” PIA FOR DNA
COLLECTION, supra note 71, at 4 n.12.
97DNA-Sample Collection from Immigration Detainees, 85 Fed. Reg. 13,483, 13,487 (Mar. 9, 2020) (to
be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28). Regarding international travelers who are being inspected at or near the border,
the Fourth Amendment does not provide protection from a routine, suspicion-less, warrantless search, so long
as the search is nonintrusive. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)
(describing the border exception, a doctrine that holds that a sovereign’s national security interests at the
border outweigh the privacy interests of the international traveler); see also DNA-Sample Collection from
Immigration Detainees, 85 Fed. Reg. at 13,489.
98See DNA-Sample Collection from Immigration Detainees, 85 Fed. Reg. at 13,483 (describing the main
legal and policy reasons supporting DNA collection from immigration detainees as the ability to identify guilty
and innocent parties); see also id. at 13,487 (summarizing the governmental interests served by DNA
collection from immigration detainees as “identification of persons in custody, facilitating safe and secure
custody, informing decisions concerning detention and release pending further proceedings, clearing the
innocent, and bringing the guilty to justice”); id. at 13,488 (stating that collecting DNA from the broadest class
permitted under the law “maximizes [the law’s] value in promoting public safety”).
99See Kalhan, supra note 59, at 59 (describing how immigration surveillance is increasingly “decoupling
the territorial border of the United States from… its migration border: the set of boundary points at which
nation-states authorize individuals to enter or be admitted, prevent or allow their entry or admission, or subject
them to possible expulsion”).
100Id. at 60.
101See id. at 17-22.
102See id. at 23-25.
103See id.
104See id. at 19.
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DNA contains much more information than other biometrics, including
information that many people consider sensitive such as “gender, familial relationships,
and other hereditary information, race, health, disease history and predisposition to
disease, and perhaps even sexual orientation.”105 The potential applications of DNA
analysis are infinite and are expanding every day.106 Even as the law has struggled to
keep pace with these new applications, it can be surmised from recent history that, as
technology improves, the role of DNA in immigration and criminal processes will
continue to grow.
In its new policy, DOJ seeks to alleviate concerns about privacy harms by
characterizing the DNA profiles stored in CODIS as “sanitized ‘genetic fingerprints,’”
claiming that they are useful only to identify an individual and cannot be used to
“disclose the individual’s traits, disorders, or dispositions.”107 However, it is becoming
increasingly evident that this “non-coding” DNA contains more information than
previously believed and that technological advances will likely enable more information
to be mined from the profiles stored in CODIS.108
In addition, because DOJ retains DNA samples and not just DNA profiles, it is
entirely possible for the government to mine these samples for sensitive information that
we know to be linked with DNA.109 The sample itself contains information about a
person’s entire genetic make-up, which is significantly more than and different in kind
from the type of biometric information that is currently gathered, as some courts have
recognized.110 Government access to a person’s DNA information goes far beyond
serving the purpose of identifying that person.111 The combination of interoperable data
systems storing biometric information, unlimited data retention times, and little
oversight and transparency over the retrieval and use of sensitive biometric information
increases the likelihood of function creep.112
B.

PERPETUATION OF INACCURACIES

Widespread collection and sharing of DNA information across government
agencies can perpetuate inaccuracies that originate from one source.113 These
inaccuracies can cause the wrong people to be profiled and surveilled, subjecting them
to repeated intrusions of privacy in the form of searches and interrogations.114 Based on
current information-sharing practices designed to protect national security, we know that

105LYNCH,

supra note 77, at 7.
Oliphant & Terry, supra note 35, at 454.
107DNA-Sample Collection from Immigration Detainees, 85 Fed. Reg. 13,483, 13,485 (Mar. 9, 2020) (to
be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28).
108See, e.g., Stephen S. Hall, Hidden Treasures in Junk DNA, SCI. AM. (Oct. 1, 2012),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/hidden-treasures-in-junk-dna/ [https://perma.cc/X4S9-ND9Y].
109LYNCH, supra note 77, at 7-8.
110Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 948 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The concerns about
DNA samples being used beyond identification purposes are real and legitimate.”)).
111See, e.g., Daniel I. Morales et al., Opinion, DNA Collection at the Border Threatens the Privacy of All
Americans, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/23/opinion/dna-collection-borderprivacy.html [https://perma.cc/QT6P-4U39] (suggesting that verification of family relationships and
mitigation of future criminal risk are pretexts for the new DOJ policy).
112Kalhan, supra note 59, at 70-71.
113LYNCH, supra note 77, at 9; see also Morales et al., supra note 111 (“A comprehensive DNA database
may lead law enforcement to lean even more heavily on genetic technology. But forensic genetics can point
to the wrong suspect.”).
114See LYNCH, supra note 77, at 9; see also Morales et al., supra note 111.
106See
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existing immigration records are “notoriously inaccurate and out-of-date.”115 For
example, thousands of U.S. citizens have been transferred to ICE custody by state and
local law enforcement based on inaccurate immigration records.116 As this experience
shows, we know that when such errors are disseminated across multiple systems and
agencies, they can be very difficult to correct.117
Even when the information in DNA databases is accurate, those whose DNA
is in the system are more likely to be wrongly implicated in a crime.118 In a comment
opposing the DOJ regulations expanding compulsory DNA testing of immigration
detainees, the Electronic Frontier Foundation describes the case of Lukis Anderson,
whose DNA was transferred by the paramedics who had treated him to a crime scene
where they treated a victim hours later.119 Anderson was arrested and charged with
murder even though he was in the hospital at the time the murder occurred.120 If his DNA
had not been in the system, he would not have been wrongly implicated in the crime.
While Anderson’s DNA was in the state criminal database because of a prior felony
charge, immigration detainees’ DNA will be entered into CODIS even if they have never
been arrested for a crime.121 This means that the risk of this type of mistake is
disproportionately likely to affect immigrants who have never had any involvement with
the criminal justice system.
C.

ALIENAGE DIFFERENTIAL

The new DOJ rule is an example of an alienage differential in privacy under
the Fourth Amendment.122 The circumstances leading an immigrant to be detained by
immigration law enforcement officers are distinct from the circumstances that lead to
criminal arrests because, in the vast majority of cases, immigrants in civil detention have
not been suspected of committing a crime.123 Although there is no link between lack of
immigration status and criminality, the new DOJ policy seems to assume that an
immigration detainee, like a criminal arrestee, is under heightened suspicion of criminal
behavior.124 Therefore, the collection of DNA under the new DHS policy represents an
“unprecedented shift” from an intrusion on privacy based on conduct to one that is based
on status.125 In other words, every immigrant is a suspect. Legal experts on immigration
115LYNCH,

supra note 77, at 9.
at 9 (discussing the Secure Communities program that shares information between state and local
law enforcement and immigration agencies).
117Id. at 10-11.
118EFF Comment, supra note 80, at 5.
119Id.
120Id.
121See DNA-Sample Collection from Immigration Detainees, 85 Fed. Reg. 13,483, 13,483 (Mar. 9, 2020)
(to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28).
122This characterization derives from the description of a “class differential” in privacy by criminal
justice and poverty law scholars, that is, people of different classes have different reasonable expectations of
privacy from warrantless government searches and seizures and people from lower economic classes are more
likely to suffer intrusions of privacy by the government. See Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in
Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1389, 1392-93 (2012) (citing Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception
to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 401-05 (2003)).
123Growth in ICE Detention Fueled by Immigrants with No Criminal Conviction, TRAC IMMIGRATION
(Nov. 26, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/583/ [https://perma.cc/F5BG-KH2W] (indicating
that only 36% of individuals in ICE had a criminal conviction).
124See DNA-Sample Collection from Immigration Detainees, 85 Fed. Reg. at 13,484 (claiming that “most
immigration detainees are held on the basis of conduct that is itself criminal”).
125EFF Comment, supra note 80, at 2.
116Id.
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and genetic privacy recently opined in The New York Times, that “[b]y severing the
longstanding prerequisite of prior (alleged) criminal conduct for compelled DNA
collection, the government puts us all at risk.”126 They warn that “once you break the
norm requiring criminal conduct for inclusion in CODIS, it is difficult to re-establish.”127
D.

EXACERBATING RACIAL AND ETHNIC INEQUITIES

Black and Latino men are disproportionately represented in U.S. law
enforcement biometrics databases, including in CODIS.128 Existing racial bias in the
criminal justice system has caused Black and Latino men to be unequally targeted by
law enforcement for arrest and convicted of crimes.129 The new policy would exacerbate
this inequity in the criminal justice system by adding a disproportionate amount of
genetic information about Latinx people to CODIS.130
E.

DATA BREACH

Whenever personal information is stored in a database, it is subject to breach.131
DOJ has dismissed concerns about privacy harms in the event of a data breach affecting
CODIS.132 However, a recent report of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs identified numerous vulnerabilities in the computer networks of
federal agencies that hold personal data.133 One of the worst federal agency data breaches
in recent years was the 2015 Office of Personnel Management breach, which resulted in
the disclosure of security clearance data of more than 20 million current and former
federal employees, including more than 5.6 million fingerprint records.134 Those whose
DNA profiles are stored in CODIS therefore face greater privacy risks from
unauthorized access to their genetic information than do people who have not been
subjected to a DNA test by law enforcement.

126Morales

et al., supra note 111.

127Id.
128EFF Comment, supra note 80, at 8 (citing Jason Silverstein, The Dark Side of DNA Evidence, NATION
(Mar. 27, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/dark-side-dna-evidence/ [https://perma.cc/Y5C4-S7AZ]
(“Black individuals made up 40 percent of profiles in CODIS[.]”).
129See Thomas L. Johnson & Cheryl Widder Heilman, Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System,
58 BENCH & B. MINN. 29, 29 (2001).
130EFF Comment, supra note 80, at 8 (noting that the addition of “750,000 DNA profiles of immigrant
detainees annually will undoubtedly further skew the racial disparities apparent in CODIS”).
131See, e.g., David Lazarus, Cybersecurity Incidents Spark the Call for Encrypted Data, GOVTECH.COM
(Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.govtech.com/news/Consumer-Confidential-A-Breach-Too-Far-Encrypt-OurData.html [https://perma.cc/W52E-V75V] (discussing security breaches involving corporate and government
databases); id. (“Experts generally acknowledge that it’s impossible to keep hackers at bay.”).
132DNA-Sample Collection from Immigration Detainees, 85 Fed. Reg. 13,483, 13,489 (Mar. 9, 2020) (to
be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28) (stating, in response to comments raising this concern, that the DNA
information will be “subject to the privacy and use restrictions of CODIS [and] kept in secure storage by the
FBI”). The new regulation describes how DNA profiles in CODIS are delinked from personally identifiable
information so that unauthorized disclosures of DNA information would not be traceable to individuals. Id.
133STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS: PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS, 116TH CONG., REP. ON FEDERAL CYBERSECURITY: AMERICA’S DATA AT RISK 7 (2019)
(noting that DHS “failed to address cybersecurity weaknesses for at least a decade”).
134David Alexander, 5.6 Million Fingerprints Stolen in U.S. Personnel Data Hack: Government,
REUTERS (Sept. 23, 2015, 11:50 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cybersecurity-fingerprints/5-6million-fingerprints-stolen-in-u-s-personnel-data-hack-government-idUSKCN0RN1V820150923
[https://perma/cc/LD55-6MJG].
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UNIQUE RISKS FOR NONCITIZENS

This Part describes the unique and more immediate risks that noncitizens face
from the expansion of DNA surveillance. It is designed to address arguments that
expansions of DNA surveillance and data mining are inevitable and will affect citizens
and noncitizens alike, and that it is therefore futile to object to this incremental expansion
of DNA surveillance. It explains how DOJ’s new policy imposes risks on a politically
and socially marginalized population.
Deportation for a violation of civil law is a unique risk of heightened biometric
surveillance that only noncitizens face. Even prior to the implementation of DOJ’s new
policy, documented and undocumented immigrants were under heightened surveillance
because of existing biometric collection and sharing practices.135 DHS’s Secure
Communities program requires state and local law enforcement agencies to share
fingerprint data with ICE in order to determine if they belong to a noncitizen and in
order to enable ICE to decide whether to pursue an enforcement action against the
person.136 With more DNA profiles of noncitizens being added to CODIS under DOJ’s
new policy, noncitizens face a heightened risk of immigration surveillance in states that
authorize DNA collection from arrestees.
When noncitizens are deported, some face discrimination or worse treatment
upon return to their native countries.137 The United States has entered into data-sharing
agreements with other nations that could result in biometric information about
immigration detainees being shared with the governments to which they are deported or
where they choose to reside after deportation.138 Refugees and asylum seekers are
particularly at risk if their biometric information is returned to the countries from which
they fled.139 Foreign governments can request DNA information about their citizens who
are immigration detainees through Interpol.140 The misuse of DNA information by
foreign governments is not a theoretical harm: From 2016 to 2017, the Chinese
government collected DNA from nearly 36 million people, primarily Uighurs, an ethnic
and religious minority in the country, as a strategy to track the activities of people
suspected of not being loyal supporters of the Communist Party.141 Uighur Chinese

135See

Kalhan, supra note 59, at 41-53.
U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, SECURE COMMUNITIES: A
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO IDENTIFY AND REMOVE CRIMINAL ALIENS 1-3 (2009). In 2014, Secure
Communities was replaced with a similar program called the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP).
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting
Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t (Nov. 20, 2014). It was later reinstated by the Trump Administration
in 2017. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 30, 2017).
137LYNCH, supra note 77, at 3.
138See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET: DHS AGREEMENTS WITH GUATEMALA,
HONDURAS, AND EL SALVADOR 1 (2019) (explaining that DHS arrangements with Guatemala, Honduras and
El Salvador “aim[] to enhance cooperation between DHS and Northern Triangle countries to prevent and
combat crime and other threats to public security, by expanding biometric data collection and information
sharing”).
139LYNCH, supra note 77, at 3.
140DNA-Sample Collection from Immigration Detainees, 85 Fed. Reg. 13,483, 13,491 (Mar. 9, 2020) (to
be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28). In the Final Rule, the Department of Justice states that, “The United States
does not comply with [Interpol] requests [for biometric information] if it believes they are made for oppressive
or improper purposes.” Id. However, once the information is shared, there is no way for the Department of
Justice to control how it is used. See id.
141Sui-Lee Wee, China Uses DNA to Track Its People, with the Help of American Expertise, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb.
21,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/business/china-xinjiang-uighur-dna-thermofisher.html [https://perma.cc/JAD9-LEJL].
136See
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citizens have received asylum in the United States for past persecution on the basis of
ethnicity and religion.142 For some, deportation is a death sentence.143
Finally, DOJ’s new rule exacerbates the criminalization of immigration in the
United States.144 DOJ states that neither the purpose nor the effect of DNA collection
from immigration detainees will be to “stigmatize and vilify migrants and treat them as
threats and criminals.”145 It equates DNA collection with other biometric information
collection (such as fingerprinting and photographing) without addressing the distinctive
privacy harms, discussed earlier, that DNA collection can impose. However, it ignores
the larger policy context in which this administration has criminalized immigration by
cracking down on prosecutions for immigration violations;146 vilifying nonwhite
immigrants through harsh rhetoric;147 and stigmatizing longtime undocumented
residents by rescinding immigration policies intended to integrate them.148 Advocates
for immigrants blame this toxic combination for an increase in hate-crime violence
against Latinx people.149
V.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW DNA COLLECTION POLICY

A.

THE BIOETHICS PERSPECTIVE

The expansion of DNA surveillance in the immigration context is troubling
from the perspective of bioethics in part because it could be the proverbial canary in the
coalmine. In a New York Times op-ed, law professors Daniel I. Morales, Natalie Ram,
and Jessica L. Roberts characterize DOJ’s new policy as “the latest development in a
worrying trend of escalating DNA surveillance.”150 They predict, ominously, a dystopian
future in which all U.S. residents are subject to compulsory DNA collection: “This new
immigration policy moves us toward completion of [a genetic panopticon]: a genetic

142See, e.g., Andrew McCormick, One Uighur Man’s Circuitous Journey to Safety, NATION (Jan. 13,
2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/world/muslim-uighur-china-asylum/ [https://perma.cc/N73M6PD3] (describing one Uighur-native’s journey to finding refuge in the United States after facing religious
persecution in China).
143See, e.g., Sarah Stillman, When Deportation is a Death Sentence, NEW YORKER (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/15/when-deportation-is-a-death-sentence
[https://perma.cc/E9FY-STUL] (recounting cases of “people who had been deported to their deaths or to other
harms” in Mexico and Central America).
144See WALTER A. EWING ET AL., AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
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database that will ultimately encompass anyone within United States borders, including
ordinary Americans neither convicted nor even suspected of criminal conduct.”151
While some might disregard such predictions as hyperbolic, there is ample
evidence that DOJ is not adequately considering the potential privacy harms of its new
policy. In response to concerns that DNA collection from immigration detainees would
perpetuate inaccuracies in criminal investigations, DOJ responded that “DNA matches
are not taken as conclusive evidence of guilt. Rather, they are used as investigative
leads.”152 DOJ cites its prior rulemaking for the proposition that “an increase in the
number of [DNA] profiles . . . ‘does not create a significant risk of innocent persons
being implicated in crimes.’”153 DOJ implicitly dismisses this privacy risk by not
addressing when such a risk becomes significant.
Likewise, DOJ fails to recognize the significance of using a prospective risk
assessment of criminality for immigrants. Some of the comments submitted in response
to DOJ’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking noted that DNA-sample collection of initial
entrants to the United States would not serve many of the purported governmental
interests relating to public safety because “initial entrants … cannot have previously
committed crimes within the United States, so there could not be crime-scene DNA
evidence that would match to their DNA profiles.”154 DOJ defended its policy by stating
inter alia that “the benefits of DNA-sample collection include the creation of a
permanent DNA record that may match to DNA evidence from a later crime, if the
detainee remains in or later reenters the United States and commits such a crime.”155
DOJ invoked the purpose of prospective risk assessment again in response to comments
criticizing the permanent retention of immigration detainee DNA profiles in CODIS.156
Finally, DOJ does not acknowledge a problem with the disparate impact that
DNA collection from immigration detainees will have on ethnic minorities. It simply
states that the regulation is neutral with respect to national origin, race, ethnicity, and
other demographic characteristics.157 It also states that “[t]he ethnic and racial
proportions in the DNA databases parallel the representation of demographic groups
among the persons from whom DNA samples are collected,” without acknowledging
how racial and ethnic profiling can play a role in determining who ends up in
immigration detention.158
B.

THE IMMIGRATION POLICY PERSPECTIVE
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In this time of extreme immigration policymaking that has included increasing
workplace immigration enforcement raids,159 family separations,160 the “remain in
Mexico” policy for asylum seekers,161 kids in cages,162 the Muslim ban,163 and the change
in public charge policy,164 it is fair to ask: Why does the DOJ’s new policy pertaining to
DNA collection of immigration detainees matter?
For U.S. citizens, there is a self-interested reason to pay attention to how the
new policy is implemented: We may be next in line for compulsory DNA collection.
Beyond this, however, the new policy matters because it is another attempt by this
administration to dehumanize immigrants. Even if it seems less degrading than some of
the policies listed above, it is part of this administration’s broader agenda to criminalize
immigration through reliance on false claims. For example, shortly after winning the
2016 election, President-Elect Donald Trump stated his intention to deport or incarcerate
two or three million undocumented immigrants “that are criminal and have criminal
records, gang members, drug dealers.”165 The estimate blatantly misrepresents the actual
number of undocumented immigrants with criminal convictions.166
Likewise, DOJ claims that ensuring public safety is the overarching rationale
of its new DNA collection policy.167 However, DOJ fails to provide any evidence that
its new rule will increase public safety.168 First, DHS acknowledges in a PIA for the new
DNA collection policy that “it is unlikely that CBP or ICE would be able to use a DNA
profile match for public safety or investigative purposes prior to either an individual’s
removal to his or her home country, release into the interior of the United States, or
transfer to another federal agency” because of the time it would take for the FBI to
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process a DNA sample.169 Second, studies of DNA databases in the United States and
European countries show that merely increasing the number of profiles stored does not
correlate with improved efficacy in crime-solving.170 Third, several recent analyses have
debunked the belief that unauthorized immigration is linked with criminality.171 From
an immigration policy perspective, it is important to push back on every new policy that
is based on false and dehumanizing information about immigrants.
VI.

CONCLUSION

DHS’s new piloted DNA collection from immigration detainees represents a
significant expansion of DNA surveillance in the United States. The new policy will
have the practical effect of adding millions of DNA profiles of noncitizens to CODIS.172
More fundamentally, it is contributing to a transformation of the norms around
collection and retention of genetic information by the government—namely those that
justified retention of genetic profiles in CODIS based on an individual’s connection to
criminal activity. It can be expected that norm shifting around DNA surveillance of
noncitizens will spill over to citizens as well.
As this administration engages in unprecedented uses of DNA collection from
immigrants, it must anticipate and address ethical concerns that arise from its actions.
So far, DHS and DOJ have failed to engage in careful, deliberative, and measured
policymaking around recent expansions of DNA testing in the immigration context—
whether it involves DNA testing for family reunification purposes or for broader “public
safety” purposes.173 More robust privacy protections around DNA collection from
immigrants would not only better protect the interests of participants, but would also
establish the legitimacy of DNA analysis in immigration processes by improving
transparency, efficiency, and accessibility.174 As we become increasingly aware of the
limits of our knowledge with respect to future uses of DNA information, it is crucial to
take a measured, proportional approach to the use of DNA tests in immigration contexts.
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This Article has described the most ethically troubling privacy harms arising
from widespread DNA surveillance of immigrants. It amounts to a call for action to
advocates, policymakers, and scholars with expertise in genetic privacy, bioethics, or
immigration to ensure that regulation of DNA collection and analysis in the immigration
context is guided by the principles of necessity and proportionality.

